

**DEE ANN KIVITTER**  
Claimant

**ST. FRANCIS HEALTH CENTER**  
Respondent  
Self-Insured

<sup>1</sup> P.H. Trans. at 8.

Claimant has a long history of back problems and chiropractic treatment. In fact, claimant had seen a chiropractor for her back less than a month before this incident at work. Respondent does not dispute that the incident occurred in the course of claimant's employment. However, respondent disputes that the incident constitutes an accident that arose out of the employment. Because of claimant's long-standing history of back problems, respondent contends that the back injury was the result of a personal risk and, therefore, is not compensable.<sup>2</sup>

Claimant was working for respondent without restrictions on her date of accident. During the week before her injury she was not experiencing anywhere near the degree of pain that resulted from the work-related accident. Claimant testified that she experienced a sudden onset of pain at work on September 18, 2003, after twisting and bending down to lift the hamburger buns, that was unlike the usual aches and pains she would experience from her normal activities.

The Workers Compensation Act places the burden of proof upon claimant to establish her right to an award of compensation and to prove the conditions on which that right depends.<sup>3</sup> "Burden of proof" means the burden of a party to persuade the trier of facts by a preponderance of the credible evidence that such party's position on an issue is more probably true than not true on the basis of the whole record."<sup>4</sup>

An injury arises out of employment if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations, and incidents of the employment.<sup>5</sup> Whether an accident arises out of and in the course of the worker's employment depends upon the facts peculiar to the particular case.<sup>6</sup>

It is well settled in this State that an accidental injury is compensable even where the accident only serves to aggravate or accelerate an existing disease or intensifies the

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<sup>2</sup> *Hensley v. Carl Graham Glass*, 226 Kan. 256, 597 P.2d 641 (1979); *Martin v. U.S.D.* 233, 5 Kan. App. 2d 298, 615 P.2d 168 (1980).

<sup>3</sup> K.S.A. 44-510(a); *See also Chandler v. Central Oil Corp.*, 253 Kan. 50, 853 P.2d 649 (1993); *Box v. Cessna Aircraft Co.*, 236 Kan. 237, 689 P.2d 871 (1984).

<sup>4</sup> K.S.A. 44-508(g); *See also In re Estate of Robinson*, 236 Kan. 431, 690 P.2d 1383 (1984).

<sup>5</sup> *Brobst v. Brighton Place North*, 24 Kan. App. 2d 766, 771, 955 P.2d 1315 (1997).

<sup>6</sup> *Springston v. IML Freight, Inc.*, 10 Kan. App. 2d 501, 704 P.2d 394, rev. denied 238 Kan. 878 (1985).

affliction.<sup>7</sup> “The test is not whether the job-related activity or injury caused the condition but whether the job related activity or injury aggravated or accelerated the condition.”<sup>8</sup>

Based upon the record compiled to date the Board finds claimant’s present condition is compensable as an aggravation of her preexisting condition. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision to award preliminary benefits against respondent should be affirmed.

As provided by the Act, preliminary hearing findings are not binding but subject to modification upon a full hearing on the claim.<sup>9</sup>

**WHEREFORE**, it is the finding, decision, and order of the Appeals Board that the Order entered by Administrative Law Judge Bryce D. Benedict on December 12, 2003, is hereby affirmed.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

Dated this \_\_\_\_\_ day of May 2003.

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BOARD MEMBER

c: John H. Bryan, Attorney for Claimant  
J. Phillip Gragson, Attorney for Respondent  
Bryce D. Benedict, Administrative Law Judge  
Paula S. Greathouse, Workers Compensation Director

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<sup>7</sup> *Demars v. Rickel Manufacturing Corporation*, 223 Kan. 374, 573 P.2d 1036 (1978); *Chinn v. Gay & Taylor, Inc.*, 219 Kan. 196, 547 P.2d 751 (1976); *Harris v. Cessna Aircraft Co.*, 9 Kan. App. 2d 334, 678 P.2d 178 (1984).

<sup>8</sup> *Hanson v. Logan U.S.D.* 326, 28 Kan. App. 2d 92, 11 P.3d 1184, *rev. denied* 270 Kan. 898 (2001).

<sup>9</sup> K.S.A. 44-534a(a)(2).